Week 7

Harris broaches the topic of reproductive choice in light of the democratic presumption in chapter five. At the core of this liberal ideology is that the burden of proof is on those that wish to deny a liberty rather than those that wish to practice it. Further, the proof needs to be sufficient to the degree as to warrant consideration, here Harris demarcates this degree as relating to harm to others. This is a slippery slope as harm isn’t well defined when it relates to others or society. The prosecution of faith healing gone awry still has only been successfully litigated in the context of child fatality, the only thing keeping the same argument from being used in cases of those in which an adult has been killed is that by the states definition, once you reach the age of consent you’re responsible for every belief you have. It is obvious this only the case as to avoid the steeper slope that follows. In contrast to this, there isn’t any legislation against smoking during pregnancy, only stigmatism. I think opponents of reproductive choice should pick their bone first with those that affect negatively on the unborn before they direct their energy at those that seek to encourage the investigation of prospective methods of enhancement.

   In chapter six the focus shifts to the concerns of reproductive liberty: disability and super-ability. Harris identifies three fallacies common to arguments against reproductive liberty and enhancement. The supposition of the first is that the choice to repair/enhance function implies a judgement on the previous state. This would assume that every choice is made primarily on the basis of being against a negative and not explicitly for a positive. The second fallacy is based on the sense of violation of the principle of equality when one aims to produce children that are less damaged or have enhanced capacities. This assumes that the problem inequality doesn’t already exist and that one viable solution will just make the problem worse. Finally, the third fallacy, that the demarcation of disability is made relative to normalcy, errors in that which is species-typical functioning can be disadvantages given a change of circumstance. To Harris’s definition of disability, one would be disabled when drowning in magma. This assumes that what we consider normal always involves adaptation to circumstances we are subjected to, so while we may not be able to adapt the world completely to accommodate those with disabilities it is always to ease their relation to the normal.